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The Special Interest Group Higher Education (SIGHE) of the Worshipful
Company of Educators was set up in the year 2017 and currently has over
thirty members who are Freemen and Liverymen of the company interested
in  Higher  Education,  Higher  Education  policy,  research,  and  research
training. Topics of interest include educational methods and concepts for
universities,  training  of  doctoral  students,  training  of  skills  relevant  for
higher education; mentoring and career development of junior academics.
The group is chaired by Benedikt Löwe.
So far, the SIGHE had two meetings, one at Christ's College, Cambridge,
on 3 November 2017 and one at New College, Oxford, on 20 January 2018.
During these meetings, SIGHE decided on a number of projects that would
define and inform the discussion of the members of the group.
The first project, entitled The educator’s role in Higher Education: What
distinguishes it  from other educational  sectors?,  is  coordinated by James
Crabbe and Max Weaver. The two coordinators have produced two position
papers that constitute this document. The position papers are to be seen as
personal statements of their respective authors rather than a description of
the position of  the SIGHE, let  alone the company.  They are supposed to
provoke  useful  reflection  and  discussion.  The  authors  of  the  papers
encourage readers to contact them directly and discuss the content of the
papers.
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How might differences in kind and degree between the two
principal forms of tertiary education (Further Education, FE
and Higher Education, HE) affect the responsibilities and
demands of the educators’ role?
by M. James C. Crabbe
A key difference between teaching in HE and FE is the role of research.
Currently, research is not a criterion for being an FE lecturer.  At ‘research-
intensive’  universities,  research  is  predominant  in  the  ‘lecturer’  or
‘associate  professor’  role,  although  teaching  is  seen  as  increasingly
important.   At  ‘teaching-intensive’  universities,  particularly  post-1992
universities, research can still be important, but it can be more pedagogical
research than subject-specific research.
Further  education  (FE)  teachers  teach a  range of  subjects  in  one of
three main areas:
vocational  training (including  apprenticeships)–preparing  students  for
work and making sure they have up-to-date skills; 
academic teaching–teaching a range of academic qualifications mainly at
GCSE and A-level;
basic skills–teaching basic skills in areas such as numeracy, literacy and
ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages).
They  may  also  teach  recreational  courses  that  support  personal
interests, such as local history or watercolours. Although they work mainly
with post-16 and/or adult learners, they can also work with students aged 14
to 19 who are studying vocational subjects. Work can take place in any of
the following settings:
i. a general or specialist FE college,
ii. sixth form colleges,
iii. adult and community education centres,
iv. universities,
v. prisons and youth offender organisations,
vi. voluntary and charity organisations,
vii. work-based learning. 
Like teachers in primary, secondary and university education, they need
to
 plan and prepare lessons,
 teach across  a  range  of  qualification  types  and levels,  in  day  or  
evening classes or open access workshops,
 research and develop new topics, courses and teaching materials,  
including online resources,
 teach  large  and  small  groups  of  learners  from  a  range  of
backgrounds, abilities and ages,
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 monitor, assess and mark students' work,
 maintain accurate records and monitor students' progress,
 set  and oversee examinations and liaise with awarding bodies  to  
ensure quality standards are met,
 carry out a pastoral role as a personal tutor to students,
 conduct tutorials on a one-to-one basis with learners,
 plan additional support for students,
 contribute to course team meetings to monitor, review and evaluate  
relevant courses,
 represent the college at parents' evenings, taster days, open days and
careers or education conventions,
 keep up to date with, and implement, college policies,
 interview prospective students,
 liaise with other educational professionals and organisations,
 organise work experience and carry out learner assessments in the 
workplace,
 undertake a range of administrative tasks.
Many  FE  teachers  work  part  time  or  on  a  sessional  basis  and  may
supplement their income through private tuition, evening classes, national
examination marking, teaching on residential courses, external consultancy
work  or  writing  textbooks.  A  growth  in  partnership  working  between
organisations has resulted in FE teachers moving between institutions, e.g.
schools,  sixth-form  colleges,  higher  education  and  community-based
learning centres.
Qualifications for Teachers. Teaching in an HE institution has classically
been ‘training for future professors’, i.e. by researchers who did not have a
formal  teaching qualification.  However,  now training for teaching is  now
usually  operated  ‘in  house’,  with  criteria  and  qualifications  (Fellowship,
Senior  Fellowship,  and  Principal  Fellowship)  provided  by  the  Higher
Education  Academy  (HEA).  Assessment  of  HE  teaching  is  currently  by
HEFCE through the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF).  
Assessment of FE teaching is by the  Office for Standards in Education
(Ofsted).
It  is  possible  to  become  a  further  education  (FE)  teacher  without  a
teaching qualification, although such teachers will be expected to study for
one. This will increase the chances of getting a job and receiving further
promotion. Individual institutions set their own requirements and some may
have their own in-house training programmes.
Qualifications for FE teachers are available at various levels:
 Level 3 Award in Education and Training: an introductory, knowledge-
based course, which doesn't have a placement and you can complete 
before being in a teaching role.
 Level  4  Certificate  in  Education  and  Training:  develops  practical  
teaching skills and requires you to have at least 30 hours of teaching 
 Crabbe, Löwe, Weaver                                                         page 3
practice.
 Level 5 Diploma in Education and Training: this is the recognised, full
teaching qualification for the sector and you must have at least 100 
hours  of  teaching  practice.  You  can  choose  to  take  a  specialist  
pathway  at  this  level  in  literacy,  ESOL,  mathematics  or  special  
educational needs (SEN).
One  can  go  straight  into  the  Level  5  qualification  without  having
completed the other levels. If you've completed a Level 3 or 4 qualification,
you may be able to achieve recognition for prior learning.
Qualifications  are  generally  offered  by  FE  colleges,  universities  and
other training providers on a full or part-time basis. However, for part-time
level  4  and 5 qualifications,  one will  usually  need to  organise your  own
teaching practice placement. One can also apply to do a postgraduate PGCE
in Further Education or Post-Compulsory Education.
To  teach an academic  course,  for  example,  one  will  typically  need a
degree.  For  vocational  subjects,  one will  need  an  appropriate  vocational
qualification (usually minimum Level 3) and professional experience.
Higher Education in Further Education. As of  13 March 2017,  there
were  241 FE Colleges  (FECs)  delivering higher  education.  This  includes
providers that are directly funded by HEFCE (Higher Education Funding
Council) and those that deliver higher education through a sub-contractual
arrangement.
A majority of students at FECs are registered on undergraduate courses
other  than  first  degrees,  such  as  foundation  degrees,  HNDs  (Higher
National  Diplomas)  and HNCs (Higher National  Certificates).  In  2016-17
this was more than three-quarters of all undergraduate students taught at
FECs.
There have been increases in the number of students starting courses at
all  levels at FECs in the past decade, but the relative increase has been
greatest for foundation degrees (cf. Fig. 1). The number of students starting
these courses was 75 per cent higher in 2016-17 than in 2007-08. 
There has also been a large increase in entrants to HND courses. The
number of  students  starting HNDs increased by 10 per  cent  in  2016-17
compared with the previous year, and the number of entrants has more than
doubled since 2010-11.
The scale of provision of higher education at FECs varies across regions.
Accounting  for  population  size,  roughly  three  times  as  many  students
register on higher education courses in FECs in the North East, North West
and Yorkshire and the Humber than in the London, South East and East of
England regions.
A study by the Centre for Global Higher Education at University College
London Institute of  Education (Dougherty & Callender, 2017) highlighted
the inequalities in access to HE, graduation from HE and economic success
post-graduation.  It pointed out the FECs account for 8.5 % of HE students,
but were at risk of being ignored in policy discussions, which focused on
getting disadvantaged students into selective universities.
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Fig. 1.
In order to play a key part in policy discussions, FECs need a mission to
unite around, which will enable the sector to regain ownership of what it
stands for nationally, regionally, and locally (Hadawi & Crabbe, 2018). Such
a vision is needed to create a TVET (Technical and Vocational Education and
Training) sector that is targeted to develop an effective shared culture, close
skills shortages and skills gaps in education, enhance community cohesion
and improve productivity and inclusive growth. 
Some concluding questions.
1. Where should skills in arts and humanities be taught?
2. Should research now be part of Further Education?
3. Where does learning skills and employability merge into creativity,  
and can one teach–or indeed learn–to be creative?
References.
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Pegging Levels
by Max Weaver
Preamble. This paper was written to introduce the first project undertaken
by the Special Interest Group on Higher Education.1 The Group decided in
January  2018  that  a  consideration  of  the  differences  between  Higher
Education (HE) and Further Education (FE) might prove both useful  and
stimulating.  Because we have each been involved with both HE and FE,
James Crabbe and I volunteered to coordinate ‘SIGHE Project 1’. Our hope
is that our initial  papers will  stimulate further contributions from SIGHE
members and, perhaps, from members of the newly-formed SIG on Music
Education.
Any serious discussion of policy—say of further and higher education—is
unlikely to progress far without someone asking, ‘What do you mean by…?’
or saying, ‘We need some definitions for our report’. Indeed, without some
degree of agreement about what an item under discussion is, the discussion
is unlikely to be productive. It will miss issues—or fudge them. This paper
begins with some reasons why.
Defying Definition.  I throw a ball to you. We can pretty well guarantee
that, if it was a ‘tennis ball’ when I threw it, it will be a ‘tennis ball’ when
you catch it. 
But words are not like that. If I say to you, ‘I tend to keep to the right’,
you might ‘hear-me-to-say’ that: (i) I hog the motorway fast lane; or (ii) I
ignore the signs on Tube staircases enjoining me to ‘keep left’;  or (iii) ‘I
favour Tory candidates when I vote’. As it happens, I don’t do any of these.
What I ‘meant-to-say’ is that (iv) I think seriously about justice and that, if
that  thinking leads  me to  a  conclusion  or—in  Kantian  terms—a  ‘maxim’2
about what is the right thing to do, I tend to follow that maxim. 
Analogue and binary.  I  doubt  that  we can ‘define our  way out’  of  the
problem just put. We know that both FE and HE are somehow additional to
some  earlier  education  but,  beyond  that,  we  struggle  for  precision  in
definition and consistency of practice. Here’s why.
These  terms—further,  advanced,  higher,  general,  vocational—are
‘analogue’ (rather than ‘binary’). Think of the on/off switch as ‘binary’ and
the volume control as ‘analogue’.
They  are  open-textured  or,  in  W.  B.  Gallie’s  phrase,  ‘essentially-con-
1 It  draws  on  papers  I  have  prepared  for  presentations  at  conferences  of  the
Society of Legal Scholars in 2015, 2016 and 2018.
2 Mary Gregor (ed),  Immanuel Kant,  Groundwork of  the Metaphysics of Morals
(Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998, original 1785) 31, note, ‘A
maxim is the subjective principle of acting, and must be distinguished from the
objective principle, namely the practical law.’ (emphases in the original).
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tested’.3 We  see  examples  in  the  work  of  Ludwig  Wittgenstein,4 Ronald
Dworkin,5 Daniel Dennett,6 David Miller,7 and many others. Think of voting
‘leave’, or of demanding ‘social justice’. 
Dworkin’s explanation of kindness and honesty illuminates the notion,
‘Kindness and honesty [two principles that often conflict]  cannot  just
have one content or another, because moral claims cannot be barely true…
No moral particles fix what these virtues just are…[They] are interpretive
concepts: their correct use is a matter of interpretation, and people
who use them disagree about what the best interpretation is.’
Similarly, if a sergeant is told, ‘Choose the best soldier for the mission!’
what is meant (or understood) by ‘best’? The fastest runner? The soldier
with the most stamina? Or who can lift the greatest weight? Or who is the
strongest-minded and most resilient?8
Jonathan Haidt identifies a dual-process or two-stage approach to such
judgement-making:
3 W  B  Gallie,  ‘Essentially  Contested  Concepts’,  (1965)  56  Proceedings  of  the
Aristotelian Society 167-198.
4 Ludwig Wittgenstein,  Philosophical Investigations  (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953 and
1958):  cf. especially  33e. Ludwig  Wittgenstein  (trs.  GEM  Anscombe),
Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963) at 33e: ‘Someone says to
me “shew the children a game.” I teach them gaming with dice, and the other
says “I didn’t mean that sort of game.” Must the exclusion of the game of dice
have come before [the speaker’s] mind when he gave me the order?’ And, I would
add, to the hearer when hearing it?
5 Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 2011)
[JfH] 123-188 and, at 120, (emphases added). Dworkin’s approach draws on a
strong philosophical tradition. In  Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth,
1977) 103, he cites Gallie, note 2 above. In  JfH at 60, 124 and 160 there are
explicit references to Wittgenstein, note 3 above.
6 ‘[T]here is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose
philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.’ Daniel Dennett,
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. New York: Simon & Schuster (1995) 21. Cf. also Daniel
Dennett, ‘The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artifacts’ Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 50, Supplement (Autumn, 1990), pp. 177-194.
7 David  Miller,  Social  Justice (Oxford:  OUP,  1979),  explores  three  contesting
conceptions  of  the  concept  of  social  justice:  (property)  rights-based;  desert-
based; and needs-based.
8 This all  begins with Hume: ‘Reason is,  and ought only to be the slave of  the
passions, and can never pretend to any other office that to serve and obey them’,
David  Hume  (ed.  L  A  Selby-Bigge  and  P  H  Nidditch),  A Treatise  of  Human
Nature,  (Oxford: OUP, 1978),  415. A J Ayer,  Hume (Oxford:  Oxford University
Press, 1980) 19, comments that this ‘celebrated dictum…was intended…to apply
not  merely  to  judgements  of  value  but  to  all  the  formal  exercises  of  our
understanding.’ 
Cf. also, Joseph Hutcheson, ‘The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch”
in Judicial Decision’  (1929) 14  Cornell Law Quarterly 274-88. John Bargh and
Melissa Ferguson, ‘Beyond  behaviorism: On the automaticity of higher mental
processes’ (2000) 126(6)  Psychological Bulletin 925-945 suggest that there is a
good deal  of  automaticity  in  what  we take to  be effortful  reflection.  Cf. also
Joshua Shepherd, ‘Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions’ (2015)
93(2) Australasian Journal of Philosophy 335-351. 
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(1) ‘[M]oral judgment is caused by quick moral intuitions and is followed
(when  needed)  by  slow,  ex  post  facto  moral  reasoning’.9 Some  of  our
intuitions are ‘directly  shaped’  by social  pressures.  ‘[T]he mere fact that
friends,  allies,  and acquaintances have made a moral  judgment exerts  a
direct  influence  on  others’,  although  sometimes  that  might  ‘elicit  only
outward conformity’.10
(2) Our brains are machines used mostly for winning the argument that
our intuitions are right11 and only exceptionally for reflective review—and
perhaps a change of mind. ‘The final judgment may be determined either by
going with the strongest intuition or by allowing reason to choose among
the  alternatives  on  the  basis  of  the  conscious  application  of  a  rule  or
principle.’12 ‘[C]onscious verbal reasoning [does not] command...our actions
[but]...is rather more like a press secretary, whose job is to offer convincing
explanations for whatever the person happens to do.’13
The  ‘definitions’  of  FE  and  HE  (indeed  of  what  counts  as  E)  leave
matters wide open to  ex post rationalisations of hunches and prejudices.
Their  interpretation  is  a  form  of  moral  judgement—a  plumping  or
preference for one set of outcomes as better than others. Policy decisions
are not pure science. They are not Popperian falsifiable hypotheses as to
what in fact is the case14 but contestable value-judgements.
9 Jonathan  Haidt,  ‘Intuition  and  Moral  Judgment’  (2001)  108(4)  Psychological
Review 814-834,  817.  Cf. also  Daniel  Kahneman,  Thinking—Fast  and  Slow
(London: Penguin, 2012) for an influential account of ‘dual process’ theory. For a
perspicacious  review  of  other  broadly  similar  accounts,  cf. Keith  Frankish,
‘Dennett’s Dual Process Theory of Reasoning’ in Carlos Muñoz-Suárez and Felipe
De Brigard (eds.),  Content and Consciousness Revisited, with Replies by Daniel
Dennett (Cham: Springer, 2015) 73-92.
10 Ibid.
11 Jonathan Haidt & Fredrik Bjorklund, ‘Social  intuitionists answer six questions
about morality’ in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral psychology, Vol. 2: The
cognitive science of morality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007) 181-217, 191,
citing Robert Wright,  The Moral Animal (New York: Pantheon, 1994) 280, ‘The
brain is like a good lawyer: given any set of interests to defend, it sets about
convincing the world of their moral and logical worth, regardless of whether they
in fact  have any of  either.  Like a lawyer,  the human brain wants victory,  not
truth.’
Marc Hauser, Fiery Cushman, Liane Young,cR. Kang-Xing Jin and John Mikhail, ‘A
Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications’ (2007) 22(1)  Mind &
Language 1–21,  15,  conclude:  (1)…all  of  the  demographically  defined groups
tested within our sample showed the same pattern of judgments and (2) subjects
generally  failed to provide justifications that could account for  the pattern of
their  judgments.’  And,  at 17,  ‘under the conditions employed, intuition drives
subjects ’ judgments, and with little or no conscious access to the principles that
distinguish between particular moral dilemmas.’ 
12 Haidt, note 5, 819. 
13 Ibid.
14 Since the very influential work of Karl Popper (cf. Stephen Thornton, Karl Popper,
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2018 Edition
for a review of his work), scientific method has been thought to depend on (i) the
formation and then (ii) the testing of what are known as  falsifiable hypotheses.
The hypothesis ‘the moon is made of cheese’ Has been tested and falsified by
visiting the moon, digging beneath its surface and finding rock but no cheese.
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Context  and  Consensus.  Mostly,  the  context  helps  to  keep  speaker-
meaning and hearer-meaning within touching distance of each other.15 In
our  scenario,  if  we  were  talking  generally  about  motorway  driving,  you
would probably be right to take meaning (i):  or,  if  tube travel,  (ii);  or,  if
politics, (iii); or, if ethics, pragmatism, utilitarianism; or, if Immanuel Kant
and John Rawls, (iv). 
But there is a further factor: viz. shared experience. If you say to me that
you enjoy classical  music,  I  might take you to mean the whole range of
serious  music  from  Palestrina  to  Stockhausen.  But,  if  we  are  both
musicologists, I might—probably correctly—take you to mean the music of
the time and style of Bach, Handel and Mozart and not the more romantic
music  of  Brahms,  Wagner,  Mahler  or  Richard  Strauss.  Given our  shared
experience, you would not have to explain all this to me. 
The key mechanism at work in such situations is ‘lexical priming’,  of
which Jenny Kemp gives this example.
‘[L]exical priming will vary between different communities of practice,
as the  usage of  words  varies  in  different  communities.  If  I,  as  a  corpus
linguist, use the word ‘corpus’, I am using it to mean ‘a collection of texts,
nowadays stored electronically’; I would use it in chunks such as ‘building a
corpus’, ‘the corpus was analysed’,  ‘corpus linguistics’,  ‘parallel  corpora’.
However, to a medical professional, ‘corpus femoris’ or ‘corpus adiposum’
would be more familiar; and to a law academic, the chunks ‘a writ of habeas
corpus’, ‘the Habeas Corpus Act’, ‘the corpus of the asset’ or ‘Corpus Juris
Secundum’ would be much more likely to spring to mind.’16
Shared experience—and the lexical priming it entails—is crucial to what
we understand by ‘higher education’ and by ‘further education’. The words
themselves—‘higher’ and ‘further’—'don’t do it for us.’ Neither is it a matter
of lexicography. Dictionaries do not dictate meaning. The terms ‘define’ and
‘definition’  are  misleading.  They  cannot  make  meaning  unambiguously
definite. The ‘finite’ is too fluid for that. All a dictionary can do is capture
usages—as those usages persist or change. 
It is tempting to think of definitional difficulties as ‘core-and-penumbra’
problems. That makes good sense when we are rounding fractions up or
down  to  the  nearest  whole  number  or  classifying  the  risks  in  our  risk
register as high, medium or low. However, when we are dealing with open-
textured  language—with  what  W  B  Gallie  called  ‘essentially  contested
concepts’17—core-penumbra  thinking  is  mistaken.  We  struggle  to  find  a
However, the seemingly less probable hypothesis that the moon has cheese at its
centre has not yet been falsified.
15 Peter Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (1962) 48 Proc. British Academy 1–
25,  underlines  the  differences  between  the  perspectives  of:  a  first  party  (cf.
speaker); a second party (cf. addressee-hearer); and a third party (cf. overhearer,
witness, adjudicator).
16 Kemp, J. (2018) ‘A rosy-fingered dawn for legal education? Insights from a corpus
linguistic perspective on text’. Nottingham Law Journal, 27(2) 82-94.
17 Cf. Ronald  Dworkin,  Justice  for  Hedgehogs  (Cambridge  MA:  Belknap  Press,
2011) [JfH] 123-188 and, at 120, ‘Kindness and honesty [two principles that often
conflict] cannot just have one content or another, because moral claims cannot be
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‘core’.18 
We might agree that we want a ‘just result’ but might disagree as to
whether justice is based on property rights, human rights, desert or need.
But,  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  the  property-owning
classes would think the preservation of property rights fundamental to their
conception  of  a  ‘just  result’.  Then,  the  apparent  so-called  ‘core’  simply
reflected a wide consensus of that particular usage. But such a consensus
can break down—usually gradually. Whilst nowadays even the economically
privileged do not think of  ‘rights’  as necessarily property-based, there is
great dispute over the extent of the ‘right to respect for one's private and
family  life…home  and…correspondence’  and  what  restrictions  are
’necessary in a democratic society’.19 That dispute is not about lexicological
correctness but about ethical values.
Praxis. Discrepancies between speaker-meaning and hearer-meaning will
be rare if  (i)  the concepts are ‘mathematical’  (two-ness,  triangularity)  or
‘binary’ (think of the on/off switch) and/or (ii) the speaker and hearer are in
shared  experiential  territory  (went  to  the  same  kinds  of  schools  and
universities,  etc).  By  contrast,  where  (iii)  the  concepts  are  essentially
contested concepts, open-textured or ‘analogue’ (think of the continuously
variable volume control) and/or (iv) the speaker’s and hearer’s experiential
backgrounds diverge, there can be latent or patent miscommunication and
disagreement.
Open-texture is  sometimes obvious and the contestants  for  particular
conceptions of the concept are alerted. But at other times it is latent and the
tension  between  competing  conceptions  will  go  unnoticed  as  the
conversationalist happily ‘talk past each other’. 
Furthermore, a word that seems ‘binary’ can be put under pressure and
found  to  be  ‘analogue’.  For  example,  we  might  take  the  meaning  of
‘instantly’  for  granted.  Apparently,  we  mostly  automatically  but
unmathematically  conceptualise  ‘instants’  as  ‘intervals’  of  some  three
seconds—roughly the time it takes to shake hands.20 However, in a scientific
barely  true…No  moral  particles  fix  what  these  virtues  just  are…[They]  are
interpretive concepts: their correct use is a matter of interpretation, and people
who use them disagree about what the best interpretation is’ (emphasis added).
Dworkin’s approach draws on a strong philosophical tradition. In Taking Rights
Seriously  (London:  Duckworth,  1977)  103,  he  cites  W  B  Gallie  ‘Essentially
Contested Concepts’, (1965) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167-198.
In JfH at 60, 124 and 160 there are explicit references to Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953 and 1958).
18 Cf. note 3 above.
19 Article 8, European Convention on Human Rights provides, ‘(1) Everyone has the
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right  except  such  as  is  in  accordance  with  the  law  and  is  necessary in  a
democratic society  in  the  interests  of  national  security,  public  safety or  the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of  disorder or crime, for
the  protection  of  health  or  morals, or  for  the  protection  of  the  rights  and
freedoms of others.’ Note the italicised open-textured words and phrases.
20 Pinker,  Stephen,  The  Stuff  of  Thought:  Language  as  a  Window  into  Human
Nature. (New York: Penguin. 2008) 64-72 and 188-189.
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experiment, three seconds might well not count as ‘instant’ and there might
be a dispute as to how to operationalise the concept. That dispute might be
resolved pragmatically by eventually agreeing that the effect is ‘instant’ only
where the time taken for it to be manifested is immeasurably small.
Many of  the vogue phrases and definitions used in  the  discussion  of
educational  strategy  are  essentially  contested.  But,  too  often,  meetings
proceed with ritual incantations of the current buzz phrases—drawn from
the  latest  report—that  have  caught  the  attention  of  government  and  its
agents.  The  participants  might  feel  better  for  speaking  and  hearing  the
uplifting phrases but clear agreement on values and action might well be
absent.
Here, think of phrases such as ‘inclusive education’. There is widespread
if not universal agreement that certain kinds of exclusion—on grounds, say,
of ethnicity or gender—are unacceptable. However, who exactly has a right
to  be  included  in  exactly  what?  What,  for  example,  are  ‘reasonable
adjustments  for  persons  with  disabilities?  Skoogmusic  and  Yamaha
developed an instrument so that Clarence Adoo—a trumpet player so badly
injured in a road accident that he is quadriplegic—can participate in musical
ensembles.21 But  what  adjustments  is  it  reasonable  to  make  for,  say,  a
partially deaf teacher? In addressing that problem Sections 20-22 Disability
Act  2010  make  liberal22 use  of  open-textured  terms  (‘reasonable
adjustments’, ‘substantial  disadvantage’,  ‘relevant  matter’).  Furthermore,
the Guidance issued by the Equality and Human Rights Commission invokes
such  ‘essentially  contestable’  concepts  as  ‘proportionate  means’  and
‘legitimate aim’. 
Giving practical meaning to these open-textured terms is fundamentally
a matter of valuing the interests that compete for recognition and primacy.
Ultimately, we have to answer questions like ‘how much do we care about
that?’ or ‘do we esteem this more than that?’ Our answers to such question
will be intuitive and our intuitions will be informed by our life experiences,
many of which have been shared with those others who are of ‘like mind’.
The reasons tend to come ex post not ex ante.
In disconnecting verdicts from motives and justifications, I follow David
Hume,
‘Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never
pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them’,23 
and Thomas Scanlon,
21 https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload=9&v=MEk7CeKGai0
22 Now there’s another word!
23 David  Hume  (ed.  L.  A.  Selby-Bigge  &  P.  H.  Nidditch),  A Treatise  of  Human
Nature, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) 415. Cf. also Chris and Uta Frith,
‘Implicit  and Explicit  Processes in Social Cognition’ (2008) 60(3)  Neuron  503-
510;  Marc  Hauser  et  al.,  ‘A  Dissociation  Between  Moral  Judgments  and
Justifications’ (2007) 22(1)  Mind & Language  1–21; and the work of the social
intuitionist,  Jonathan Haidt  (e.g.).  ‘The  emotional  dog and  its  rational  tail:  A
social intuitionist approach to moral judgment’ (2001) 108 Psychological Review
814-834.
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‘Desires come to us “unbidden” and we may feel that they “impel” us to
action.’24 
Or, as the US humourist, journalist, novelist, poet, newspaper columnist,
and playwright, Don Marquis (1878-1937), put it, 
‘Ideas pull the trigger, but instinct loads the gun.’
Having  made  up  our  minds,  we  choose  our  words  to  justify  our
decisions. As Robert Wright puts it,
‘The brain is like a good lawyer: given any set of interests to defend, it
sets about convincing the world of their moral and logical worth, regardless
of whether they in fact have any of either. Like a lawyer, the human brain
wants victory, not truth.’ 25
Where does this leave us? We can look to Parliament for ‘definitions’ of
‘further  education’  and  ‘higher  education’,  but—given  the  foregoing—we
might well be disappointed. Nevertheless, it is to statutory provisions that I
now turn.
Official  Definitions.  Decades ago,  government  decreed that  post-school
college education is divided into two parts. Hence, we confront exercitive
(‘official’)26 verdicts  that  some  education  is  ‘higher’  and  some,  merely,
‘further’. But verdicts—even official ones—are conclusory. They can tell us
nothing about (i) the motives that cause them or (ii) the reasoning by which
they are rationalised, explained and ‘justified’ ex post.27 
The Higher Education Council’s website gives the following definitions,
which we can take to be in tune with the law and official practice,
‘Further education is for people over compulsory school age (currently
16 in England) which does not take place in a secondary school. Further
education courses are generally up to the standard of GCE A-level or NVQ
Level 3.
Higher education courses are programmes leading to qualifications, or
credits which can be counted towards qualifications, which are above the
standard  of  GCE  A-levels  or  other  Level  3  qualifications.  They  include
degree courses, postgraduate courses and sub-degree courses such as those
leading to HNCs or HNDs.’
Section 28(1) Further and Higher Education Act 1992 provides that a
Further Education Institution is,
24 Cf. the third of Scanlon’s John Locke Lectures on Being Realistic about Reasons,
given at Oxford in 2009, available online.
25 New York: Pantheon, 1994, 280.
26 J.L.  Austin (eds.  J.O.  Urmson & Marina Sbisà),  How to do Things with Words
(1975, 2nd edn.: Cambridge MS, Harvard University Press). I can name my car
‘Ferrari’ but at DVLC it remains officially a Mini. I have no name-changing power
to ‘exercise’.
27 ‘I’ll have a cappuccino’. Although that’s my verdict, it says nothing about why?
My usual? For a change? Because you are having one? Because I’ve read in the
newspaper that milk helps to avoid brittle bones?
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‘any educational institution principally concerned with the provision of
one or both of the following—
(a) full-time education suitable to the requirements of  persons over  
compulsory school age who have not attained the age of nineteen 
years, and 
(b) courses of further or higher education.’
By virtue of Education Reform Act 1988 Section 129 (as amended by
Section 72(1) of the 1992 Act) to be eligible to receive funding for higher
education courses an institution must have ‘full-time equivalent enrolment
number for courses of higher education exceed[ing] 55 per cent of its total
full-time equivalent enrolment number.’
Thus far, we have learned only that:
 further education institutions do further education; 
 higher education institutions do higher education; and 
 higher education and further education are defined by the level  of  
the qualifications to which their courses lead, which is taken as Level
4 or above.28
Seemingly,  the  touchstone characteristic  of  HE must  be  substantially
present in Level 4 courses and only trivially present at Level 3 or below. It
follows that we must look at the definition of Level 4. Paragraph 4.10, The
UK Quality  Code for  Higher  Education29 provides  that,  to  be  awarded a
Level 4 qualification, a candidate must have:
 ‘knowledge of the underlying concepts and principles associated with
their area(s) of study, and an ability to evaluate and interpret these  
within the context of that area of study; [and] 
 an  ability  to  present,  evaluate  and  interpret  qualitative  and  
quantitative data, in order to develop lines of argument and make  
sound judgements in accordance with basic theories and concepts of 
their subject(s) of study.’ 
‘Typically’,  holders of these Level 4 ‘higher educational’ qualifications
‘will be able to: 
 evaluate  the  appropriateness  of  different  approaches  to  solving  
problems related to their area(s) of study and/or work;
 communicate the results of their study/work accurately and reliably, 
and with structured and coherent arguments; and 
28 Level 4 includes: certificate of higher education (CertHE); higher apprenticeship;
higher  national  certificate  (HNC);  level  4  award;  level  4  certificate;  level  4
diploma; level 4 NVQ.
29 Part  A:  Setting  and  Maintaining  Academic  Standards,  The  Frameworks  for
Higher Education Qualifications of UK Degree-Awarding Bodies, October 2014,
available online.
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 undertake further training and develop new skills within a structured
and managed environment.’
Here too we see open-textured, contestable terms: evaluate, interpret,
appropriate, structured, coherent.
Vocationality. Nevertheless, Level 4 is not ‘ivory tower’. 
 Holders  of  a  Level  4  qualification  will  have  ‘the  qualities  and
transferable skills necessary for employment requiring the exercise of
some personal responsibility’; 
 Level 4 qualifications can be work-based; and
 Level 4 qualifications, which are HE, include ‘higher apprenticeships’
and higher national  certificates (HNC) and Level  3  qualifications,  
which are FE, include ‘advanced apprenticeships’.
We should also note that many qualifications at Level 6 or beyond are
strongly work-related and constitute steps towards professional recognition.
OFQUAL’s writ runs to ‘general’ as well as ‘vocational’ qualifications.30
Here, as examples, are a couple of questions from the specimen A2 AQA
paper in ‘Ethics and Philosophy of Mind’;
 Explain  the  difference  between  cognitivist  and  non-cognitivist
theories of ethics.
 How might a utilitarian attempt to justify preventative imprisonment 
(imprisoning someone to  prevent  them from committing  a  crime,  
rather than because they have committed a crime)?31
The second of these shows traces of vocationality, but I doubt that the
issues raised by the first would be probed in many job interviews. However,
it is imaginable that they would be probed in an Oxbridge entry interview. 
Blooming concepts. Jeremy Bentham thought the children’s game of push-
pin valuable because it increased human happiness. He went as far as to say
that, ‘Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts
and sciences of music and poetry.’32 We might grant that those that disagree
are  prejudiced  to  some  extent.  That  would  be  the  natural  result  of
experience. But that does not disprove the thesis that some skills are of a
higher order than others are. There could be some foundation beside the
prejudice. 
Are there ‘higher order’ skills? Is philosophical competence of a higher
order than musical competence? The skills of a master craftsperson or of an
30 Cf. the OFQUAL webpage.
31 Cf. AQA  General  Certificate  of  Education,  Advanced  Level  Examination.
Philosophy.  Ethics  and  Philosophy  of  Mind,  AQA-2175-ETHICS-SQP-2014,
available online.
32 Jeremy Bentham,  The Rationale of Reward (London: Robert Heward, 1830, 1st
edition) 206.
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expert  classical  singer  are  clearly  different  to  those  of  a  lawyer  or  a
physicist,  but  is  there  any  touchstone  that  renders  the  latter  two  of  a
‘higher’ order than the former two? Is the third-rate philosophising of an art
historian or critic of a ‘higher’ order than the first-rate professional practice
of a skilled artist—just because it is ‘philosophising’ rather than ‘painting’?
It  is  tempting to  find,  in  Benjamin  Bloom’s  well-known taxonomy,33 a
spurious certainty and a rationale for opinions that might well be tainted by
prejudice.  Bloom arranged  classes  of  skills  in  linear  ascension:  from (i)
knowing;  to (ii)  comprehending;  to (iii)  applying;  to (iv)  analysing;  to (v)
synthesising; to (vi) evaluating. It is tempting to imagine that the essence of
FE lies in (i), (ii) and (iii) whereas the essence of HE lies in (iv), (v) and (vi).34
But (i) to (vi) are open-textured. Can I know ‘my way to the Elephant and
Castle’ without comprehending the roads and trainlines? And do I not apply
that knowledge when I form the  Gestalt of ‘my way to the Elephant and
Castle. ‘Ah!’ you might say, ‘we concede that the relationship (i) to (iii) is not
linear, but your example demonstrates that (i)-(iii) are a group that does not
involve (iv) to (vi)—just like FE.’ 
Acceptance  of  the  non-linearity  of  (i)-(iii)  recognises  that  ‘knowing’,
‘comprehending’ and ‘applying’ are open-textured, interpretive concepts of
which there can be several competing conceptions. Furthermore, it implies
that we shall get a range of answers if we ask, ‘What am I doing:35…when I
know that a zebra is an animal?’; or ‘…when I understand that a zebra is an
animal?’; or ‘...when I  apply my knowledge and understanding in order to
explain to my granddaughter that a zebra is an animal?’
But consider an FE course in Plumbing. We imagine that the well-trained
plumber will be able to do more than install, repair and replace by knowing,
comprehending  and  applying  instructions.  We  expect  her  to  be  able  to:
diagnose  faults;  install  domestic  central  heating;  advise  on  whether  a
combination boiler will be best. And could she possibly complete such tasks
competently without—in addition to knowing, understanding and applying—
analysing, synthesising and evaluating?
The concepts in Bloom’s taxonomy are meaningful, but they are not se-
parated from each other in the way that the elements in the Periodic Table
are. They are essentially contested concepts. When they are applied to cate-
gories of activities or usages, their interpretive nature is easily revealed.
33 Benjamin Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: Book 1 Cognitive Domain
—the Classification of  Educational  Goals (New York:  Longmans,  Green & Co.,
1956).
34 Brenda Sugrue provides a brief  but useful  critique of  the received version of
Bloom’s taxonomy; cf.  Problems with Bloom’s Taxonomy, October 2002, available
online. In addition to pointing out that the taxonomy is ‘not supported by any
research on learning’, she comments that, ‘The distinctions in Bloom’s taxonomy
make  no  practical  difference  in  diagnosing  and  treating  learning  and
performance gaps. Everything above the “knowledge” level is usually treated as
“higher order thinking” anyway, effectively reducing the taxonomy to two levels.’
That draws the line in a different place to that which I suggest in the text here.
But,  my  point,  as  I  now  go  on  to  try  to  explain,  is  that  line-drawing  is
inappropriate.
35 Cf. note 22 above.
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I do not mean to negate or to make redundant any of the concepts under
discussion  here.  For  example,  ‘justice’  is  undoubtedly  a  value  to  be
cherished even though there are deep disagreements as to its  basis and
extent.  Just  consider  the  notion  of  ‘justice  for  the  families  of  murder
victims’. Some will feel that only the death penalty is sufficient. Others will
say  that  life  imprisonment  should  be  for  life.  Others  might  accept  the
current custodial practices. 
So too with ‘reasonable’, which oftentimes serves as a synonym for the
more obviously interpretive ‘sufficiently’ (Is the radio loud enough for you,
dear?).  ‘What’,  we have to ask,  ‘is  sufficient/just?’;  and ‘in whose eyes?’.
‘Justice’ is not rendered meaningless by such questions. The questions it
begs are worth the begging. 
To be clear, my argument is not that open-textured words are without
meaning. Rather, it is simply that their meanings are contestable and—from
time to time when consensus breaks down as experiences diverge and new
attitudes and expectations emerge—contested. 
My argument is semiotic in that it is about the vagaries of some of the
signs  that  we  use—and  too  easily  take  for  granted—in  our  efforts  to
communicate. It amounts to a plea for deeper, more careful, conversations
amongst and between practitioners and policymakers. But to address this
communication  problem  lexically  is  simply  to  move  the  value  bubbles
around under a wallpaper of words. The solution, I suggest, is to look at
usage—at ‘usage  → meaning’, rather than at ‘definition/meaning  → usage’.
The direction of fit is not word → world, but world → word.
Application.  Day-to-day  undergraduate  HE  teaching  is—at  least  in  my
experience  as  a  student  and  teacher  of  law—often  dominated  by  a
pedestrian version of Bloom (i) to (iii), with only a leavening of Bloom (iv) to
(vi). A large proportion of time is spent in setting out and learning ‘what is
the case.’ Furthermore and increasingly, to secure their entry qualifications
for HE,  some students have been ‘taught to the test’. ‘A’ level has not set
these  students  free  intellectually.  They  learn  ‘facts’  and  ‘criticisms’—for
recall when prompted by signals that are also taught—much as they learned
about Santa Claus and about the Tooth Fairy. That ‘facts’ are falsifiable by
counter-evidence—whereas  ‘criticisms’  are  not—goes  largely  unnoticed.
Hence, teachers in the first year of higher education in law face the problem
of  whether  to  expose  their  students  to  inconvenient  and  unsettling
uncertainties or, for the time being, to meet their exaggerated expectations
of certainty and wait for much longer processes of realisation to take place.
Arguably, even at the beginning of higher education or in some at least
of  further  education,  students  should  begin  to  confront  Cicero’s  seven
questions.  As  John  Mikhail  argues,  Cicero’s  questions36—Who?  What?
Where? By what aids? Why? How? When?—‘can transform one description
of an action into another’.37
36 Cicero, Marcus Tullius. 84BC. De Inventione.
37 John  Mikhail,  Elements  of  Moral  Cognition (New York:  Cambridge University
Press, 2011) 126.
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Of course, we need to master some information and skills so as to free
mental  space  for  using  them  in  more  demanding  problem-solving  and
decision-making. But ‘teaching to the test’ oversimplifies too often. Rules
come  from  cases  and  are  used  to  decide  other  cases.  The  process  is
dynamic. Rather than take snap shots, students need to make a movie—and
remember that we shall never get to the end of some of the movies.
Clinical  legal  education  steers  around  this  ‘Santa  Claus  Syndrome’.
Being un-didactic and un-expository,  it  can greatly  hasten the realisation
process. Faced with clients and their problems, students cannot help but see
for themselves that: 
 ‘law in action’ is very different from ‘law in the books’; 
 real  world  problems  involve  evidence  and  proof,  documents,  
procedure, financial and intellectual resources; 
 the relevant law is to be found from a range of sources, rather than 
neatly packaged in one text book; 
 law is operational and argumentative; 
 not all of the law works well; and
 inequalities of resources, both economic and financial, have profound 
effects on the way the law works, or does not work, for the clients  
that they see.
Evidence and procedure appear immediately as crucial factors. Whilst
there might be a contractual aspect to the dispute, the finer points of the
postal rule about offer and acceptance are far less likely to be relevant than
‘Can  the  client  find  that  document?’  or  ‘Can  the  other  party  can  be
persuaded to answer letters or is insured?’ 
Furthermore, the business of advising clients involves choosing—often
from a number of alternatives—a plan of action. That polycentric or many-
bodied problem probably uses all six of the Bloomean skills. The challenge
lies in bringing many things together for consideration. 
The  contrast  between  the  clinical  model  and  the  Mrs  Beeton-style
approach  to  the  law  of  contract  formation—which,  for  most  students,
constitutes the most common induction into common law method—is stark.
The  books  tell  students  that  contracts  are  made  by  assembling  the
ingredients—bargained exchange of x for y, evidenced by offer, acceptance,
intention to create legal relations. That the contractual cake made by this
mixing of  ingredients  often  fails  to  cover  all  eventualities,  or  that  many
contracts are on take-it-or leave-it terms, or that contracts modify other—
non-contractual—rights and duties is, of course, made clear eventually. But I
fear that the ‘assemble the ingredients, mix together and cook until done’
model has a narrowing effect on students’ appreciation of how law works—
and hence of what law is like.38 
38 In the mid 1970s, the Law Division (which I was privileged to head) of the then
Polytechnic of the South Bank began to draw on the clinical experiments that had
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Legal  certainty—the predictability of  litigation outcomes that litigants
and potential litigants crave, and the economy needs—is often a function of
a normative consensus amongst those who have the (often covert) power to
shape the law. But the literature and students’ conditioning conjures up the
misleading notion that certainty is only a matter of using clear words when
articulating the rule. Of course, whilst the consensus is settled, the contest
of meaning and morals is postponed.
I draw from this experience the more general notion that we might be
well-advised to identify three standpoints or ideal types:
 the non-reflective practitioner—easily conflated with ‘teach me to the 
test’;
 the reflective non-practitioner—the inconvenient critic; and
 the reflective practitioner—to be valued particularly.
But,  I  hope  I  have convinced  readers  that  it  would  be  a  mistake to
assume  that  FE  students  are  to  be  trained  to  be  totally  unreflective
practitioners.
Soft and hard. In a recent letter to The Times newspaper, Adam Pettitt, the
Head of the independent Highgate School, said, 
emerged in the USA. In the UK, only Warwick University shared that interest
with us. Our 1979 submission to the Council of Academic Awards for revision and
continuation of our Ll B course mainstreamed clinic. We used: taster exposures
to real clients: simulations; and, for some students, a final year option in Welfare
Law that assessed students’ handling (under professionally qualified supervision)
at real cases.
However, it is important to note that we did not see ourselves a starting a ‘trade
school’ or as heavily vocational. The submission document stated clearly that,
‘[t]he clinical  element  has  not  been introduced with  the primary  objective  of
enhancing the student’s professional competence although we believe this to be
an important and worthwhile by-product. Instead, it is our aim to complete (or to
provide additional perspectives) on the picture painted by the more conventional
taught elements of the course. To put it shortly, we intend that students should
learn ‘by doing’, and are not primarily concerned they should learn ‘to do’.
In the 1980s,  I  wrote some theoretical  pieces about this  development:  cf. my
‘Clinical Legal Education: Competing Perspectives’ (1983) 17 The Law Teacher 1
and ‘Ignoring Complexity: Law, Law Schools and the Public Interest’ (1985) 19
The Law Teacher 3.
London South Bank University is still very much in the game, but so too, it is
pleasing to say,  are many others.  Cf. further,  amongst many other  items:  the
webpage  of  the  Global  Alliance  for  Justice  Education;  Evans,  Adrian,  et  al.
Australian Clinical  Legal  Education:  Designing and Operating a Best  Practice
Clinical Program in an Australian Law School. ANU Press, 2017; the webpage of
the European Network for Clinical Legal Education, which has started STARS—
Skills Transfer in Academia: A Renewed Strategy Enhancing Legal Clinics in the
EU. In the USA, the American Bar association now requires that US law degrees
should contain at least six credits of experiential learning.
Clinical  legal  education  is  widely  thought  to  be  beneficial,  but  its  causative
mechanisms have not been thoroughly researched. It works, but we are not quite
sure how and why it does.
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‘Since the introduction of  the EBacc and Progress  8 measure,  young
people have fled subjects such as the creative arts in the belief that there is
a hierarchy of subjects that will make them more employable. Yet the UK’s
creative industries contribute an estimated £92 billion to the economy. To
make the necessary changes that will leave early learners with the widest
pallet of opportunity, we need a mature, sustained political dialogue about
curriculum  reform  with  a  longer  time  frame  than  that  allowed  by
electioneering.’39
Which of the subjects is the higher? Is there a 1, 2, 3,  etc.  order? Or,
1= ,1=, 2, etc.? Or 1, 2=, 2=, etc.? Again, we struggle for precision about
‘higher’ and our prejudices can run riot.
Conclusion. Practically, pragmatically, organisationally, we need Levels, or
something like them. Without them, the academy would probably be chaos
except at very low student: staff ratios. Hence, my purpose in this piece has
not been to sweep away all boundaries and categories. Rather, it has been to
alert  us  to  their  inevitable  arbitrariness  and  to  encourage  thinking  that
might be clothed and labelled but is not straight-jacketed, literally or by
overweening fashion.
Hopefully,  other  SIGHE  members  will  be  encouraged,  stimulated  or
provoked to contribute reflective experiences from a wider subject range.
Might we manage to cover the subject  spectrum from STEM to creative
arts?
In the hope that other SIGHE members might rise to the bait, I conclude
with some questions:
 Do we appreciate and value craft skills sufficiently? Karl Llewellyn  
regarded lawyering as a ‘craft’ that could appropriately be taught at 
postgraduate level in US law schools.40 
To illuminate his conception of craft, consider this telling passage from
an address Llewellyn gave at a banquet in the early 1940s.
‘We have fooled ourselves, we have fooled our law professors, we have
fooled the whole bewildered public, into the idea that the essence of our
craft lies in our knowledge of the law…
39 The Times, 5 June 2018, emphasis added.
40 Karl Llewellyn, ‘The Craft of Law Re-valued’ (1942) Rocky Mountain Law Review
1, reprinted in Karl Llewellyn, Jurisprudence (Chicago: CUP, 1962) 316-322, 317-
8. ‘We have fooled ourselves, we have fooled law professors, we have fooled the
whole bewildered public, into the idea that the essence of our craft lies in our
knowledge of the law...
The essence of  our  craftsmanship  lies  in  skills,  and in wisdoms;  in practical,
effective, persuasive, inventive wisdom and judgment in selecting things to get
done; in skills for moving men into desired action, any kind of man, in any field;
and then in skills for  regularising the results, for building into controlled large-
scale action such doing things and such moving of men. Our game is essentially
the game of planning and organising management (not of running it), except that
we concentrate on the areas of conflict, tension, friction, trouble, doubt—and in
those areas we have the skills for working out results.’
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The  essence  of  our  craftsmanship  lies  in  skills,  and  in  wisdoms;  in
practical, effective, persuasive, inventive wisdom and judgment in selecting
things to get done; in skills for moving men into desired action, any kind of
man, in any field; and then in skills for regularising the results, for building
into controlled large-scale action such doing things and such moving of men.
Our game is essentially the game of planning and organising management
(not  of  running it),  except  that  we concentrate  on  the  areas  of  conflict,
tension, friction, trouble, doubt—and in those areas we have the skills for
working out results.’
 What are  we to  make of  the  atelier  and conservatoire  models  of  
teaching?
 Is what artists  say about their work a true account of the creative  
process? 
 And what about critics’ opinions? 
And there must be many, many more.
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